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《中欧全面投资协定》主要条款(全文)

2020-12-31 14:13

来源: 一瓣 作者: 陈达飞

编者按:《中欧全面投资协定》(CAI)谈判完成,等待签署、生效。CAI的主要内容与欧盟在2018年提出的WTO改革方案有较大交集,如“竞争中性”、市场准入、透明度要求、国有企业、争端解决机制、强制性技术转让等等。由于WTO改革陷入僵局,CAI可被理解为“另起炉灶”,但CAI与WTO并非替代关系,而是互补的。据媒体报道可知,当前双方各执争议的主要领域是劳工条款,而从拜登执政纲领可知,这将是美方最为关切的领域。在中欧达成协议的前提下,美方的最优行为也将是与中国谈判。中国已经先发优势,也将在谈判桌上更有底气。


Key elements of the EU-China ComprehensiveAgreement on Investment
欧盟-中国全面投资协定的主要内容(CAI)
 
The cumulative EU foreign direct investment(FDI) flows from the EU to China over the last 20 years have reached more than €140 billion. For Chinese FDI into the EU the figure is almost €120 billion. EU FDI in China remains relatively modest with respect to the size and the potential of the Chinese economy.
在过去的20年里,欧盟对中国的外国直接投资(FDI)累计达到1400多亿欧元。就中国对欧盟的外国直接投资而言,这一数字接近1200亿欧元。相对于中国经济的规模和潜力,欧盟在中国的外国直接投资仍然相对较小。
 
As regards investment, the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) will be the most ambitious agreement that China has ever concluded with a third country. In addition torules against the forced transfer of technologies, CAI will also be the first agreement to deliver on obligations for the behavior of state-owned enterprises, comprehensive transparency rules for subsidies and commitments related to sustainable development.
在投资方面,欧盟-中国全面投资协定(CAI)将是有史以来中国与第三国签订的最雄心勃勃的协定。除了禁止强行性技术转让之外,CAI还将是第一份履行国有企业行为义务、全面透明补贴规则和可持续发展承诺的协议。
 
The CAI will ensure that EU investors achieve better access to a fast growing 1.4 billion consumer market, and thatthey compete on a better level playing field in China. This is important forthe global competitiveness and the future growth of EU industry.
CAI将确保欧盟投资者更好地进入快速增长的14亿消费者市场,并确保他们在中国有更好的公平竞争环境。这对欧盟工业的全球竞争力和未来增长非常重要。
 
Ambitious opening by China to Europeaninvestments
中国向欧洲投资开放的雄心
 
Firstly, the CAI binds China's liberalisation of investments over the last 20 years and, in that way, it prevents backsliding. This makes the conditions of market access for EU companies clear and independent of China's internal policies. It also allowsthe EU to resort to the dispute resolution mechanism in CAI in case of breach of commitments.
首先,CAI巩固了中国过去20年投资自由化的成就,并以此防止倒退。这使得欧盟企业的市场准入条件得以明确,不再受到中国内部政策的影响。同时,也允许欧盟在(中方)违反承诺的情况下,诉诸CAI的争端解决机制。
 
In addition, the EU has negotiated furtherand new market access openings and commitments such as the elimination of quantitative restrictions, equity caps or joint venture requirements in a number of sectors. These are restrictions that severely hamper the activities of our companies in China. The overall package is far more ambitious than what China has committed to before.
此外,欧盟还谈判达成了进一步的、新的市场开放和准入承诺,如取消一些行业的数量限制、股权上限或合资要求。这些限制严重阻碍了欧盟企业在中国的活动。整体方案远比中国之前所承诺的要雄心勃勃。
 
On the EU side, the market is already openand largely committed for services sectors under the General Agreement on Tradein Services (GATS). EU sensitivities, such as in the field of energy, agriculture, fisheries, audio-visual, public services, etc. are all preserved in CAI.
欧盟方面,根据《服务贸易总协定》(GATS),市场已经开放,并在很大程度上对服务行业做出了承诺。欧盟敏感的领域,如能源农业、渔业、视听、公共服务等领域,都在CAI中得以保留。
 
Examples of market access commitments by China:
中国市场准入承诺的例子
 
Manufacturing: China has made comprehensive commitments with only very limited exclusions (in particular, in sectors withsignificant overcapacity). In terms of the level of ambition, this would matchthe EU's openness. Roughly half of EU FDI is in the manufacturing sector (e.g.transport and telecommunication equipment, chemicals, health equipment etc.). China has not made such far-reaching market access commitments with any other partner.
制造业:中国已经做出了全面的承诺,只排除了非常有限的行业(特别是在产能严重过剩的行业)。就雄心程度而言,这将与欧盟的开放度相匹配。大约一半的欧盟外国直接投资是在制造业部门(如运输和电信设备、化学品、卫生设备等)。中国还没有与任何其他伙伴就市场准入作出如此深远的承诺。
 
Automotive sector: China has agreed to remove and phase out joint venture requirements. China will commit market access for new energy vehicles.
汽车部门:中国已同意取消并逐步取消合资企业的要求。中国将承诺新能源汽车的市场准入。
 
Financial services: China had already started the process of gradually liberalising the financial services sector and will grant and commit to keep that opening to EU investors. Joint venture requirements and foreign equity caps have been removed for banking, trading insecurities and insurance (including reinsurance), as well as asset management.
金融服务业:中国已经开始渐进放开金融服务业的市场化进程,并将同意并承诺保持对欧盟投资者的开放。在银行业、证券交易和保险(包括再保险)以及资产管理领域,对合资企业的要求和外资股本上限已被取消。
 
Health (private hospitals): China will offer new market opening by lifting joint venture requirements for private hospitals in key Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjian, Guangzhou and Shenzhen .
健康(民营医院):中国将开放新的市场,在北京上海天津、广州和深圳等重点城市取消民营医院的合资要求。
 
R&D (biological resources): China has not previously committed openness to foreign investment in R&D inbiological resources. China has agreed not to introduce new restrictions and to give to the EU any lifting of current restrictions in this area that may happen in the future.
研发(生物资源):中国在生物资源研发领域从未对外资开放。中方已同意不采取新的限制措施,并将在未来可能发生的情况下,解除现有的限制措施给予欧盟。
 
Telecommunication/Cloud services: China has agreed to lift the investment ban for cloud services. They will now be open to EU investors subject to a 50% equity cap.
电信/云服务:中国已同意取消对云服务的投资禁令。它们现在将向欧盟投资者开放,但股权上限为50%。
 
Computer services: China has agreed to bind market access for computer services - a significant improvement from thecurrent situation. Also, China will include a ‘technology neutrality' clause, which would ensure that equity caps imposed for value-added telecom services will not be applied to other services such as financial, logistics, medicaletc. if offered online.
计算机服务:中国已同意限制(收紧)计算机服务的市场准入,这比目前的情况有了很大的改善。此外,中国还将包括一项“技术中立”条款,该条款将确保对增值电信服务设置的股权上限不会适用于金融、物流、医疗等在线服务。
 
International maritime transport: China will allow investment in the relevant land-based auxiliary activities, enabling EU companies to invest without restriction in cargo-handling, container depotsand stations, maritime agencies, etc. This will allow EU companies to organisea full range of multi-modal door-to-door transport, including the domestic legof international maritime transport.
国际海运:中方将允许对相关陆基辅助活动进行投资,使欧盟企业在货物装卸、集装箱堆场和码头、海事机构等方面的投资不受限制。这将使欧盟公司能够组织全方位的多式门到门运输,包括国际海运的国内分支。
 
Air transport-related services: While the CAI does not address traffic rights because they are subject to separateaviation agreements, China will open up in the key areas of computer reservation systems, ground handling and selling and marketing services. China has alsoremoved its minimum capital requirement for rental and leasing of aircraft without crew, going beyond GATS.
航空运输相关服务: 虽然CAI没有涉及交通权,因为它们受单独的航空协议的约束,但中国将开放计算机预订系统、地面处理和销售和营销服务等关键领域。中国还取消了租赁和无机组飞机的最低资本要求,超出了《服务贸易总协定》。
 
Business services: China will eliminate joint venture requirements in real estate services, rental and leasing services, repair and maintenance for transport, advertising, market research, management consulting and translation services, etc.
商业服务:中国将取消在房地产服务、租赁服务、交通维修、广告、市场调查、管理咨询和翻译服务等方面的合资要求。
 
Environmental services: China will remove joint venture requirements in environmental services such as sewage, noiseabatement, solid waste disposal, cleaning of exhaust gases, nature and landscape protection, sanitations and other environmental services.
环境服务:中国将取消环境服务方面的合资要求,如污水处理、噪音消减、固体废物处理、废气净化、自然和景观保护、卫生和其他环境服务。
 
Construction services: China will eliminate the project limitations currently reserved in their GATS commitments.
建设服务:中国将取消目前在其《服务贸易总协定》承诺中保留的项目限制。
 
Employees of EU investors: Managers and specialists of EU companies will be allowed to work up to three years inChinese subsidiaries, without restrictions such as labour market tests orquotas. Representatives of EU investors will be allowed to visit freely prior to making an investment.
欧盟投资者的雇员:欧盟企业的经理和专家将被允许在中国子公司工作至多3年,不受劳动力市场测试或配额等限制。欧盟投资者的代表将被允许在投资前自由访问。
 
Improving level playing field – makinginvestment fairer
改善公平竞争环境,促进投资更加公平
 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) - Chinese SOEs contribute to around 30 percent of the country's GDP. CAI seeks todiscipline the behaviour of SOEs by requiring them to act in accordance with commercial considerations and not to discriminate in their purchases and sales of goods or services. Importantly, China also undertakes the obligation toprovide, upon request, specific information to allow for the assessment of whether the behaviour of a specific enterprise complies with the agreed the CAIobligations. If the problem goes unresolved, we can resort to disputere solution under the CAI.
国有企业:中国的国有企业贡献了大约30%的国内生产总值。CAI旨在规范国有企业的行为,要求它们根据商业规范行事,在购买和销售商品或服务时不得歧视。重要的是,中国还承担应要求提供具体信息的义务,以便评估特定企业的行为是否符合双方商定的“CAI义务”。如果问题无法解决,我们可以在CAI下诉诸争端解决机制。
 
Transparency in subsidies – The CAI fill sone important gap in the WTO rulebook by imposing transparency obligations onsubsidies in the services sectors. Also, the CAI obliges China to engage inconsultations in order to provide additional information on subsidies that could have a negative effect on the investment interests of the EU. China isalso obliged to engage in consultations with a view to seek to address such negative effects.
补贴的透明度:CAI对服务业补贴规定了透明度义务,填补了WTO规则手册中的一个重要空白。此外,CAI要求中国(与欧盟)进行磋商,以提供可能对欧盟投资利益产生负面影响的额外补贴信息。中国也有义务进行磋商,以寻求解决这些负面影响。
 
Forced technology transfers – The CAI lays very clear rules against the forced transfer of technology. The provisions consist of the prohibition of several types of investment requirements that compel transfer of technology, such as requirements to transfer technology to ajoint venture partner, as well as prohibitions to interfere in contractual freedom in technology licencing. These rules would also include disciplines onthe protection of confidential business information collected by administrative bodies (for instance in the process of certification of a good or a service)from unauthorised disclosure. The agreed rules significantly enhance the disciplines in WTO.
强制技术转让:CAI制定了非常明确的规则,反对强制转让技术。这些规定包括禁止几类迫使转让技术的投资要求,例如要求向合资伙伴转让技术,以及禁止干涉技术许可方面的合同自由。这些规则还将包括关于保护行政机构(例如在商品或服务的认证过程中)收集的机密商业信息未经授权不准披露的纪律。商定的规则大大加强了世贸组织的纪律。
 
Standard setting, authorisations, transparency – This agreement covers other longstanding EU industry requests. China will provide equal access to standard setting bodies for our companies.China will also enhance transparency, predictability and fairness inauthorisations. The CAI will include transparency rules for regulatory andadministrative measures to enhance legal certainty and predictability, as wellas for procedural fairness and the right to judicial review, including incompetition cases.
标准设置、授权、透明度:该协议还涵盖了欧盟行业的其他长期要求。中国将为我们的企业提供参与标准制定的平等机会。中国还将提高授权的透明度、可预见性和公平性。CAI将包括监管和行政措施的透明度规则,以提高法律的确定性和可预见性,以及程序公平和获得司法审查的权利,包括竞争案件。
 
Embedding sustainable development in ourinvestment relationship
将可持续发展嵌入我们的投资关系
 
In contrast to other agreements concluded by China, the CAI binds the parties into a value based investment relationship grounded on sustainable development principles. The relevant provisions are subject to a specifically tailored implementation mechanism to address differences with a high degree of transparency and participation of civil society.
与中国签订的其他协议不同的是,该协议将各方约束在基于可持续发展原则的价值投资关系中。相关条款受制于一个专门的执行机制,以在高透明度和民间社会的参与下解决分歧。
 
China commits, in the areas of labour and environment, not to lower the standards of protection in order to attract investment, not to use labour and environment standards for protectionist purposes, as well as to respect its international obligations in the relevanttreaties. China will support the uptake of corporate social responsibility byits companies.
在劳工和环境领域,中国承诺不降低保护标准以吸引投资,不将劳工和环境标准用于保护主义目的,尊重在有关条约中承担的国际义务。中国将支持企业承担社会责任。
 
Importantly, the CAI also includescommitments on environment and climate, including to effectively implement theParis Agreement on climate.
重要的是,CAI还包括环境和气候方面的承诺,包括有效实施《巴黎气候协定》。
 
China also commits to working towards the ratification of the outstanding ILO (International Labour Organisation)fundamental Conventions and takes specific commitments in relation to the two ILO fundamental Conventions on forced labour that it has not ratified yet.
中国还承诺致力于批准《国际劳工组织基本公约》,并对尚未批准的《国际劳工组织关于强迫劳动的两项基本公约》作出具体承诺。
 
Monitoring of implementation and disputesettlement
监督执行和争端解决
 
In the CAI, China agrees to an enforcement mechanism (state-to-state dispute settlement), as in our trade agreements.
在CAI中,中国同意建立一种执行机制(国家间争端解决机制),就像我们的贸易协定一样。
 
This will be coupled with a monitoringmechanism at pre-litigation phase established at political level, which will allow us to raise problems as they arise (including via an urgency procedure).
这将与在政治层面建立的诉讼前阶段的监测机制相结合,使我们能够在问题出现时提出问题(包括通过紧急程序)。

附:欧盟WTO改革方案(2018年)

This paper is intended to serve as a basis fordiscussion with the European Parliament, the Council and with other Members of the WTO, in response tothe conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018, which invitedthe European Commission to propose a comprehensive approach to improving together with like-minded partners, the functioning of the WTO in crucial areas, including thedispute settlement and the Appellate Body in particular. It is withoutprejudice to the final position of the European Commission on the mattersdescribed within.
 
本文的目的是为一个与欧洲议会进行讨论的打基础。针对2018年6月28日欧洲理事会的结论,安理会和其他世贸组织的成员邀请欧盟委员会与志同道合的伙伴一起,提出一个全面的方法来改善世贸组织在关键领域的功能,特别是争端解决机制和上诉机构。它不妨碍欧洲委员会关于其中所述事项的最后立场。

一、欧盟提案简介
 
The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 gave theCommission a mandate to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectivesof making the WTO more relevant and adaptive to a changing world, andstrengthening the WTO's effectiveness.
 
2018年6月28日至29日,欧洲理事会授权欧盟委员会推动世贸组织现代化,以实现世贸组织贴近现实和适应不断变化的世界的目标,以及加强世贸组织的效力。
 
The EU remains a staunch supporter of the multilateraltrading system and firmly believes that the WTO is indispensable in ensuringfree and fair trade. The multilateral system has provided the basis for therapid growth of economies around the world and for the lifting of hundreds ofmillions of people out of poverty. It has been the guarantor of trade at timesof growing tensions and the backbone of the international system of economicgovernance. Even at a time of the harshest economic conditions during the greatrecession, it has helpedavert recourse to the trade wars that have fuelled economic decline in thepast. As such the health and centrality of the multilateral system needs to bepreserved. Its marginalisation, weakening and decline have to be prevented at all costs.
 
欧盟仍是多边贸易体制的坚定支持者,坚信世贸组织是确保自由和公平贸易不可或缺的组织。多边体系为世界各国经济的迅速增长和数亿人摆脱贫困提供了基础。在国际局势日益紧张时,它一直是贸易的保护者,是国际经济治理体系的支柱。即使在大衰退期间经济状况最糟糕的时候,它也有助于避免过去导致经济衰退的贸易战。因此,我们需要维护多边体系的健康运行和中心地位,不惜一切代价防止它的边缘化、削弱和衰落倾向。
 
Unfortunately,the rules-based multilateral trading system is facingits deepest crisis since its inception. For the first time, the basictenets of the WTO, both insetting the essential rules and structure for international trade and indelivering the most effective and developed dispute settlement mechanism of anymultilateral organisation,are threatened.
 
不幸地是,以规则为基础的多边贸易体系正面临自建立以来最严重的危机。世贸组织在制定国际贸易基本规则和结构,以及向任何多边组织提供最有效和最发达的争端解决机制方面的基本原则也首次受到威胁。
 
The crisis is set to deepen further in the comingmonths, as moreunilateral measures are threatened and imposed, leading, in some cases, to countermeasures, or to mercantilist deals. In parallel, as moreAppellate Body members leave office while the new appointments are beingblocked, the disputesettlement system will soon fall into paralysis, rendering enforcement of the rules impossible. Thatwould equate to a 20-year step backward in global economic governance. It wouldmean going back to a trading environment where rules are only enforced whereconvenient and where strength replaces rules as the basis for trade relations.
 
未来几个月,随着更多单边措施的制定和强加,反制措施和重商主义也会行为也会兴起,WTO的危机将进一步深化。与此同时,随着越来越多的上诉机构成员离职和新任命成员尚未就位,争端解决机制将很快陷入瘫痪,这些规则将无法得到执行。这相当于全球经济治理倒退了20年,意味着世界将退回到另一种贸易环境。在这种环境中,规则只能在方便的情况下执行,而实力将取代规则,成为贸易关系的基础。
 
This development constitutes a major risk for the EU, both for thestability of the political order and for the sustainability of economic growth.The EU economy is highly integrated with global value chains and depends onpredictable, rules-basedinternational trade for both imports and exports.
 
这一事态发展对欧盟构成重大风险,对政治秩序的稳定和经济增长的可持续性都是如此。欧盟经济与全球价值链高度融合,对可预测的、基于规则的进出口贸易高度依赖。
 
For this reason, there is an urgent need to move the current debate ona positive path focusing on the modernisation of the WTO. It is clear that 23years after the creation of the organisation and the conclusion of the UruguayRound, themultilateral system is in need of change. While the broader WTO membership mayhave different views regarding the particularities of this change, it isunquestionable that a discussion needs to take place on the question of how tomake the WTO relevant again.
 
因此,迫切需要将当前的辩论转向一条聚焦于WTO现代化的积极道路。很明显,在本组织成立和乌拉圭回合谈判结束23年之后,多边体系需要改变。虽然不同的世贸组织成员对这一变化的特点可能有不同的看法,但毫无疑问的是,我们需要就如何使世贸组织重新具有意义的问题进行讨论。
 
For the EU, the current crisis and the ongoing marginalisation ofthe WTO have their roots in the inefficiencies of the current system. The WTO'snegotiating function has not been able to deliver any significant improvementsin the trade rulebook apart from the agreements reached on Trade Facilitationand Export Competition. The system remains blocked by an antiquated approach toflexibilities which allows over 2/3 of the membership including the world'slargest and most dynamic economies to claim special treatment. The WTO'smonitoring function is crippled by ineffective and repetitive committeeprocedures which are based on insufficient transparency. And, the core ofthe dispute settlement system is being challenged, with the distinct possibility of its paralysis in thenear term. These problems are compounded by the broader geo-strategic developments.In essence, since 1995 theworld has changed;the WTO has not.
 
对欧盟来说,当前的危机和世贸组织不断被边缘化的根源在于当前体系的低效率。除了在贸易便利化和出口竞争方面达成的协议外,世贸组织的谈判职能一直未能在贸易规则方面取得任何重大改善。该体系仍然受到过时的便捷化方法的阻碍,它允许超过三分之二的成员国(包括世界上最大、最具活力的经济体)所要求的特殊待遇。世贸组织的监督职能因不够透明的委员会程序而变得无效或低效。而且,争端解决机制的核心正在受到挑战,它在短期内就有可能瘫痪。这些问题由于更广泛的地缘战略发展而变得更加复杂。实际上,自1995年以来,世界发生了变化,但世贸组织没有。
 
In this broader context, the EU believes that a modernisation of the WTO isurgently needed. The following three papers covering:(1)rulemaking anddevelopment;(2)regular work and transparency;and(3) disputesettlement set out the direction of a possible modernisation effort.
 
在这种背景下,欧盟认为,迫切需要推动WTO的现代化:(1)规章制定与发展;(2)常规性工作和透明度;(3)为可能的现代化方向制定争端解决机制;

二、欧盟关于规则制定的建议


Background/背景
 
The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 gave theCommission a mandate to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectivesof (1) making the WTOmore relevant and adaptive to a changing world, and (2) strengthening the WTO's effectiveness. Modernising theWTO’s rulemaking activities form the central pillar of this process.
 
2018年6月28日至29日,欧洲理事会授权欧盟委员会实施世贸组织现代化,以实现以下目标:(1)提高世贸组织的相关性和适应性;(2)提高世贸组织的有效性。世贸组织规则制定议程的现代化是这一进程的核心支柱。
 
Broader contextand the focus of EU efforts
背景和欧盟努力的重点
 
The WTO also has the objective of facilitatingrulemaking. Unfortunately, this has only materialised to a very limited extent.Despite an institutional structure designed to help advance discussions, the WTO’snegotiating function has largely been blocked and is now effectively paralysed.There are multiple reasons for this situation including, in particular, divergentinterests, the extremedifficulty in arriving at consensus decisions by all 164 Members and thecurrent approach on development. In this context, any modernisation discussion has to cover both thesubstantive side and the process side of negotiations.
 
世贸组织的目标包括促进规则的制定。不幸的是,这个目标只在非常有限的程度上实现了。尽管WTO的制度结构旨在帮助推进讨论,但它的谈判职能的发挥在很大程度上受到了抑制,目前实际上已陷入瘫痪。造成这种状况的原因有很多,特别是利益分歧——使164个成员国达成协商一致的决定极为困难。在这方面,任何现代化方案都必须包括谈判职能的实质和流程两个方面。
 
Overallobjective for modernization
现代化的整体目标
 
The objective is to update the rules and to create theconditions for the rules to be updated.
目标是更新规则并为规则的更新创造条件。
 
Substance:address issues that are key toglobal trade as it evolves.
实质:随着全球贸易的发展,解决对全球贸易至关重要的问题。
 
Process:move the organisation towards amodel of negotiations where individual issues can be built up by interestedMembers under the auspices of the WTO toward eventual agreement by some or allMembers forming integral part of the WTO framework .
过程:使组织朝着有助于谈判的模式迈进。在此模式下,由世贸组织的主持,有兴趣的成员国可提出相关问题,最终由世贸组织的部分或所有成员国达成协议。
 
(一)Proposals for future rulemakingactivities in the WTO
未来关于世贸组织规则制定活动的建议
 
While the EU should continue to pursue the issues thatform part of the existing Doha mandate, there is an urgent need to broaden the negotiatingagenda with the objective of creating rules that:rebalance the system and level the playing field;address market access, discrimination and regulatory barriers in all sectorsof the economy;and strengthen the contribution oftrade to addressing the sustainability objectives of the global community. Thisshould build upon a number of initiatives already launched in Buenos Aires toreduce the costs of trade and go together with a broader reflection ondevelopment.
 
尽管欧盟应继续推动多哈谈判授权的部分问题,但更为迫切的是拓展谈判议程,制定规则以:重新平衡体系,推动公平竞争;解决所有经济部门的市场准入、歧视和监管障碍;强化贸易对实现全球的可持续性目标的贡献。这些目标,应建立在布宜诺斯艾利斯已经采取的一些行动的基础上,旨在降低贸易成本,同时对发展问题进行更广泛的思考。
 
A. Creatingrules that rebalance the system and level the playing field
制定规则,平衡系统,实现公平竞争
 
Economic operators in a number of countriesincreasingly benefit from targeted and significant market-distorting governmentsupport that is often channelled through state-owned enterprises. While theprovision of industrial subsidies can in certain cases constitute a legitimatepolicy tool, their use mayalso carry significant risks for global trade as they can disrupt productionprocesses, affectbusiness performance and skew the competitive field. The Agreement on Subsidiesand Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) is the main tool for disciplining industrialsubsidies. However, it has not been as effective as necessary to curtailcertain practices that have emerged in recent years. Indeed, itsapplication has revealed a number of gaps and ambiguities that need to beaddressed as a matter of urgency.
 
有些国家的经济经营者越来越多地受益于有针对性的、严重扭曲市场的政府支持措施,这些政府支持措施通常通过国有企业来提供。虽然在某些情况下,提供工业补贴可以构成一种合法的政策工具,但它们的使用也可能给全球贸易带来重大风险,因为它们可能扰乱生产过程,影响企业业绩,并扭曲市场竞争。《补贴与反补贴措施协定》(SCM协定)是约束产业补贴的主要工具。然而,限制近年来出现的某些做法并没有达到预期的效果。事实上,在SCM的执行过程中,揭示了一些需要作为紧急事项加以处理的漏洞和含糊不清之处。

In this contextthe EU should pursue the following proposals aimed at disciplining the use ofindustrial subsidies and the activities of state-owned enterprises.
 
在这方面,欧盟应执行下列建议,以产业补贴的使用和国有企业的活动。
 
1. Improvetransparency and subsidy notifications
增强补贴的透明度
 
The lack of comprehensive information on subsidiesprovided by Members is one of the biggest shortcomings in the application ofthe current system. Although the SCM Agreement already requires Members tonotify their subsidies, the level of compliance is poor and has deterioratedin recent years, to the extentthat as of end of March 2018 over half of the membership (90 Members) had not madeany notification1. Yet, without transparency in subsidies, Members cannotreview each other's actions and face significant obstacles in seekingenforcement of the rules. This greatly weakens the value of the substantivedisciplines.
 
缺乏关于成员国提供补贴的全面信息是现行制度在执行过程中的最大缺点之一。尽管供应链管理协议已经要求成员国通知其补贴,但遵守协议的程度较低,而且近年来有所恶化。截至2018年3月底,超过一半的成员(90名成员)没有发出任何通知。然而,如果补贴不透明,成员国就无法相互审查对方的行动,在寻求执行规则方面也面临重大障碍。这大大削弱了规则的价值。
 
The rulemaking in this area should focus on creatingincentives for WTO Members to fully comply with their notification obligations.The EU has already identified ways to improve transparency and subsidynotificationn, for example, the creationof a general rebuttable presumption according to which if a subsidy is notnotified or is counter-notified, it would be presumed to be a subsidy or even bepresumed to be a subsidy causing serious prejudice.
 
规则制定重点应该为WTO成员国充分履行其通知义务创造激励。欧盟已经确定了提高透明度和补贴通知的方法,例如,建立一个可反驳的一般推定,据此,如果补贴没有被通知或被反通知,它将被推定为补贴,甚至被推定为造成严重损害的补贴。
 
2. Better capture SOEs
更好的覆盖国企
 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are, in a number of countries, an instrument through which the state decisivelygoverns and influences the economy, often with market distortive effects. However, the growth andinfluence of SOEs in recent years is not yet matched with equivalentdisciplines to capture any market-distorting behaviour under the current rules.
 
在许多国家,国有企业是国家管理和影响经济的工具,常常产生市场扭曲效应。然而,现行规则与近年来国有企业的增长和影响力不匹配,无法捕捉到任何扭曲市场的行为。
 
Subsidies granted to SOEs are already captured by theSCM Agreement, in the sameway as any other subsidy granted by the state. With regard to instances whereSOEs themselves grant subsidies, the SCM Agreement captures them through the concept ofa "public body". However, this has been interpreted in a rather narrow manner, which allows aconsiderable number of SOEs to escape the application of the SCM Agreement. TheEU therefore should propose a clarification of what constitutes a public body, on the basisof a case by case analysis to determine whether a state-owned or astate-controlled enterprise performs a government function or furthers agovernment policy, as well as howto assess whether a Member exercises meaningful control over the enterprise inquestion.
 
对国有企业的补贴已经在《SCM协定》中得到了体现,就像国家给予的任何其他补贴一样。对于国有企业自己提供补贴的例子,《供应链管理协议》通过“公共机构”的概念对其进行了阐述。然而,这种解释相当呆板,使得相当多的国有企业得以避开供应链管理协议的约束。因此,欧盟应该澄清什么是公共机构,通过一个一个的案例分析,来确定国有或国有控股企业是否在履行政府职能或推进政府政策,以及如何评估成员国是否对相关企业拥有实质性控制权。
 
In addition, the EU should propose rules capturing othermarket-distorting support provided by SOEs when used as vehicles to pursuegovernment economic policies rather than focusing on their own economicperformance, includinginter alia, transparencywith regard to the level and degree of state control in SOEs.
 
此外,欧盟应提出规则,以考察政府利用国有企业作为工具以执行政府经济政策所造成的其它扭曲市场的行为,而不是关注国有企业自身的经济表现,包括国家对国有企业控制水平和程度方面的透明度。
 
3.Capture more effectively the mosttrade-distortive types of subsidies
更有效地识别对贸易扭曲程度最高的补贴类型
 
The SCM Agreement provides for two categories ofprohibited subsidies, namely subsidies contingent upon export performanceand subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Allother subsidies are actionable:they are permissible, unless the complaining country shows that the subsidyhad an adverse effect on its trade interests. However, the latter isquite often a challenging exercise and therefore a number of egregious types ofsubsidies that heavily distort international trade, such as thosecontributing to the overcapacity plaguing several sectors of the economy, cannot becaptured sufficiently under the current rules.
 
《SCM协定》禁止了两类补贴:依据出口额提供的补贴和根据使用国产商品相教于进口商品的补贴。所有其他补贴都是可操作的:它们是允许的,除非一国表明补贴对其贸易利益产生了不利影响。然而,这往往是一项具有挑战性的工作,因此,许多令人震惊的严重扭曲国际贸易补贴类型在现行规则下是无法充分体现的,例如那些导致产能过剩,从而困扰多个经济部门的补贴。


The rulemaking in this area should aim at subjectingthe most harmful types of subsidies that are in principle permissible under thecurrent rules to stricter rules. This could be achieved for example by expandingthe list of prohibited subsidies or by creating a rebuttable presumption ofserious prejudice similar to the lapsed Article 6(1) of the SCM Agreement. Types of subsidies that could besubject to such stricter rules include, for example, unlimited guarantees, subsidies given to an insolvent or ailing enterprisewith no credible restructuring plan or dual pricing.
 
该领域的规则制定目的在于,使现行规则原则上允许的但却有害的补贴类型服从更严格的规则。例如,可以通过扩大禁止补贴的名单,或者创建一种可反驳的关于严重损害的假设,类似于《SCM协定》中失效的第6(1)条。举例而言,可能受到如此严格规则约束的补贴类型包括:无限制的担保,对没有可靠的重组计划或双重定价的资不抵债或陷入困境的企业的补贴。
 
B. Establishingnew rules to address barriers to services and investment, including inthe field of forced technology transfer
制定新规则,解决服务和投资方面的障碍,包括在强制技术转让领域
 
Following the Joint Statements agreed in Buenos Aires, work isalready ongoing in the areas of domestic regulation, e-commerce andinvestment facilitation but further efforts will be needed to address gaps andto update the WTO rule book.
 
发布布宜诺斯艾利斯联合声明之后,国内监管、电子商务和投资便利化等领域的工作已经在进行,但还需要进一步努力协调差距,并更新世贸组织规则手册。
 
1. Need to addressmarket access barriers, discriminatory treatment of foreign investors andbehind the border distortions, including as they relate to forced technology transferand other trade distortive policies
 
需要解决市场准入障碍、对外国投资者的歧视性待遇以及其他广泛存在的扭曲背后的问题,包括与强制技术转让和其他贸易扭曲政策有关的问题
 
The multilateral rule-book on investment, whether inservices or other sectors of the economy, needs to be updated. The GATS covers investment in thearea of services via Mode 3. Nonetheless, many WTO Members still maintain broad reservations orexclusions. Sectors outside of services (such as investment in manufacturing or mining) are notcovered (althoughservices incidental to mining and incidental to manufacturing are covered). The TRIMSonly contains a limited set of disciplines relating to discriminatorymeasures/quantitative restrictions regarding trade in goods.
 
需要更新关于投资的多边规则手册,不论是在服务部门还是在经济的其他部门。通过模式3,《服务业贸易总协定》(GATS)覆盖了服务领域的投资。尽管如此,许多WTO成员仍对排斥其他国家对许多领域的投资。服务业以外的部门(如制造业或采矿业的投资)不包括在内(尽管矿业附带的服务和制造业附带的服务也包括在内)。《与贸易有关的投资措施》(TRIMS)只包含有限的有关商品贸易歧视措施/数量限制的项目。
 
Forced technology transfer, where foreignoperators are directly or indirectly forced to share their innovation andtechnology with the state or with domestic operators, has emerged asa major trade irritant. There are a number of provisions in the current WTOrule book in GATT, GATS, TRIMS andTRIPS, that shouldhelp to address forced technology transfers. However, the scope ofapplication of these provisions (including in terms of commitments taken by the parties) is limited andtherefore insufficient to address some of the most important sources ofproblems such as requirements prohibiting or limiting foreign ownership (e.g. jointventure requirements or foreign equity limitations). New rules arealso needed to address administrative review and licensing processes based onunclear rules, and processesallowing for wide discretion (e.g. marketing approvals) as well as licensing restrictions (where foreigninvestors are limited in setting market-based terms when negotiating theirtechnology licensing agreements). Certain rules in areas such as trade secrets shouldalso be reinforced, notably as regards enforcement. For example, investors arefaced with difficulties to get effective protection before the administrationand courts against unfair commercial use and unauthorised disclosure of tradesecrets.
 
强制性技术转让(即外国运营商直接或间接地被迫与国家或国内运营商分享他们的创新和技术)已成为一个主要的贸易障碍。在现行的《关贸总协定》、《总协定》、《贸易和投资协定》和《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》的WTO规则手册中,有一些条款本应该有助于解决强制技术转让问题。但是,这些规定的适用范围(包括缔约方作出的承诺)是有限的,因此不足以解决某些最重要的问题,例如禁止或限制外国所有权的规定(例如合资企业规定或外国股权限制)。还需要制定新规则,以解决基于不明确规则的行政审查和许可程序,以及允许广泛自由裁量权的程序(如市场许可)和许可限制(外国投资者在谈判技术许可协议时,在设定基于市场的条款方面受到限制)。商业机密等领域的某些规则也应该加强,尤其是在执行方面。例如,投资者很难在政府和法院得到有效的保护,以防出现不公平地利用或未经授权而披露商业机密的行为。
 
Thus, besides the specific rules to address forcedtechnology transfers, the EU should propose new rules that would complementthe existing disciplines. The new rules would introduce disciplines that wouldenable us to improve overall market access conditions for foreign directinvestment (both in theservices and non-services sectors) as well as address distortive and discriminatorypractices including legal form restrictions and performance requirements (such as thesourcing or production of goods or services locally) in a morecomprehensive manner.
 
因此,除了针对强制技术转让的具体规则外,欧盟还应提出新的规则,以补充现有规则。新规则需引入一些条款,以一种更综合的方式,提高外商直接投资(包括服务和非服务部门)的整体市场准入条件,解决扭曲和歧视性做法,包括法律限制和经营要求(例如在本地采购或生产货物或服务)。
 
There is also a clear need to address behind the borderdiscriminatory practices by reinforcing national treatment obligations anddeveloping strong domestic regulation disciplines ensuring non-discriminatoryand transparent regulatory and enforcement processes in the services andnon-services sectors.
 
此外,还需要通过加强国民待遇义务和发展强有力的国内监管纪律,以确保服务业和非服务业的非歧视性和透明性的监管和执法过程,来解决国别歧视行为背后的问题。
 
2. Need to addressbarriers to digital trade
需要解决数字贸易的障碍
 
Digital trade, or trade enabled by electronic means, is nowadayspervasive throughout the economy, covering both trade in services and in goods andenabling transactions performed completely online as well as facilitatingphysical transactions. As a consequence, establishing disciplines covering digital trade isimportant to remove unjustified barriers to trade by electronic means, to bring legalcertainly for companies, and to ensure a secure online environment forconsumers. Crucially, there are important cross-linkages to addressingforced technology transfers (such as disclosure of source code requirements). Again, newdisciplines should cover not only trade in services, but apply toall economic sectors.
 
数字贸易,或通过电子手段进行的贸易,如今已遍及整个经济领域,既包括服务贸易,也包括商品贸易,使完全的线上交易和线下实物交易均成为可能。因此,建立涵盖数字贸易的规则,对于通过电子手段消除不合理的贸易壁垒,为企业营造合法经营的环境,确保消费者拥有安全的网络环境,都非常重要。至关重要的是,在解决强制技术转让(如披露源代码的要求)方面存在重要的交叉联系。此外,新的规则不仅要包括服务贸易,而且要适用于所有经济部门。
 
C.Addressing the sustainability objectives of the globalcommunity
解决全球社会的可持续性目标
 
Finally, it is crucial to bring the WTO and its trade agendacloser to citizens and ensure that trade contributes to the pursuit of broaderobjectives set by the global community, in particular as regards sustainability. TheSustainable Development Goals agreed by the world’s leaders in 2015 already setout a detailed set of actions that need to be pursued, many of themwith strong links to trade.
 
最后,至关重要的是使世贸组织及其贸易议程更是公民友好型的,并确保贸易有助于实现国际社会确定的更广泛目标,特别是在可持续性方面。2015年,世界各国领导人达成的可持续发展目标已经制定了一系列需要实施的具体行动,其中许多与贸易有着密切联系。
 
At the current moment, the only SDG issues that is actively being negotiatedin the WTO is the elimination of the most harmful fisheries subsidies, which ishowever also an area of negotiations clearly mandated by the Doha Declaration.More can and should be done by the trade community.
 
目前,世贸组织正在积极谈判的唯一可持续发展目标问题是消除最有害的渔业补贴,但这也是多哈宣言明确授权的谈判领域。贸易界可以而且应该做更多的事情。
 
Consequently, the EU should over the coming months prepare adetailed analysis of the SDG targets and identify ways in which trade policy couldcontribute to achieving them. The EU should then together with other Membersactively pursue putting forward these issues for exploration and discussion inthe WTO.
 
因此,欧盟应在未来几个月对可持续发展目标进行详细分析,并确定贸易政策有助于实现这些目标的方式。欧盟应与其他成员国一道,积极寻求提出这些问题,以供世贸组织探讨和探讨。
 
(二)Proposals for a new approach toflexibilities in the context of development objectives
关于在发展目标的范围内采用更灵活的新方法的建议
 
The WTO was founded with development at its centre, underpinned bythe fact that free rules-based trade contributes to growth and development. However, the currentdebate promotes the view that global trade rules are somehow an impediment todevelopment and therefore that developing countries need to be exempt fromcurrent and future rules;in fact the opposite is true. The current distinction betweendeveloped and developing countries, which allows no nuance, no longer reflects the reality of the rapid economicgrowth in some developing countries. The result is that the developing countrygroup now includes some of the world's top trading nations, who havesignificant economic differences from other members of this group and who insome cases even present a level of development which surpasses that of certainMembers who are designated as developed in the organisation. This lack ofnuance and its consequences with regard to the special and differentialtreatment question has been a major source of tensions in the WTO and anobstacle to the progress of negotiations:the demand for blanket flexibilities for two thirds of the WTOmembership dilutes the call from those countries that have evident needs fordevelopment assistance, leads to much weaker ambition in negotiations and isused as a tool to block progress in, or even at the beginning of, negotiations.
 
世界贸易组织的核心任务是促进发展,其理论基础是基于规则的自由贸易有助于增长和发展。然而,目前的辩论促成了这样一种观点,即在某种程度上,全球贸易规则阻碍了发展。因此,发展中国家需要免受现行和未来规则的约束;事实恰好相反。现有规则定义的发达国家和发展中国家之间的差别,已不再反映一些发展中国家经济迅速增长的现实。结果就是,发展中国家现在包括一些世界上最大的贸易国家,它们与这个群体的其他成员有显著的经济差异,甚至在某些方面,它们的发展水平甚至要超过被某些发达国家。这个问题的一直是世贸组织紧张局势的主要根源:对WTO三分之二成员国实行全面灵活性的要求,冲淡了那些明显需要发展援助的国家的呼声,这些国家在谈判中的雄心要弱得多,并容易被用作阻碍谈判进程的工具,甚至在谈判开始时也是如此。
 
The EU fully supports the view that developingcountries should be allowed the assistance and flexibilities they need to meettheir development goals. Nevertheless, change is needed in the organisation regarding howflexibilities are crafted and implemented with a view to ensuring that flexibilitiesare made available to those Members who actually need them. In order to advancethis debate, the EU shouldpropose the following:
 
欧盟完全支持这样一种观点:应该允许发展中国家获得满足其发展目标所需的援助和规则适用的弹性。然而,WTO需要改变规则弹性的制定方式和实施方式,以确保够提供给那些真正需要的成员。为了推进这一辩论,欧盟应提出以下建议:
 
1. Graduation:Members should be actively encouraged to "graduate" andopt-out of SDT, whether horizontally or agreement by agreement.In the interim, Members shouldbe encouraged to clarify in which areas they actually use existingflexibilities and to present roadmaps detailing when they would expect to beable to assume all the obligations stemming from the WTO agreement. This couldform an integral part of a Member's TPR process.
 
“毕业”程序:应积极鼓励成员“毕业”并选择退出特别和差别待遇,不论是整体的还是单个协议的。在此期间,应鼓励各成员国澄清它们在哪些领域仍然在利用政策给予的弹性,并提出详细的路线图,说明它们预计何时能够承担世贸组织协定所规定的所有义务。这可以成为对成员贸易政策评估过程的一个组成部分。
 
2. Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in futureagreements:while acknowledging the need forparticularly flexible treatment of LDCs, flexibilities available to other Members should move awayfrom open-ended block exemptions toward a needs-driven and evidence-basedapproach that will ensure that SDT will be as targeted as possible. Variousapproaches can be used, which should satisfy the following principles:
 
今后各项协定中的特别和差别待遇:在承认需要特别灵活地对待最不发达国家的同时,其他成员所具有的弹性应从不限成员名额的集体豁免转向以需求为导向和以证据为基础的办法,以确保其针对最不发达国家。可以采用多种方法,满足以下原则:
 
(1)the agreement in question will eventually be universallyimplemented, so that thecore rights and obligations will apply to everyone and any exceptions will betime-bound;
 
该协议最终将得到普遍执行,核心权利和义务将适用于所有人,任何例外都将有时间限制;
 
(2)in-built flexibility in the form of additional commitments going beyond acore set of provisions should cater for differences among Members
附加的灵活性,即超出核心规定范围的额外承诺,应照顾到成员之间的差异
 
(3)the flexibilities available in any agreement should be proportionalto the number of Members participating and the ambition of the agreement.
任何协议中的灵活性都应与参与协议的成员数量和协议的愿景成正比。
 
There are a number of tools that can be used toimplement these proposals, for example, differentiation, graduation mechanisms, grace periods and assistance linked to implementation.
 
有许多工具可用于推行这些建议,例如执行过程中的差别化处理、“毕业”机制、宽限期和援助。
 
3. Additional SDT in existing agreements:Though existing SDT provisions incurrent agreements should not be contested, when Membersrequest additional SDT this should be done only on the basis of a case-by-caseanalysis, on the basisof:
 
现有协定中附加的特殊和差别待遇:虽然现有协定中的特殊与差别待遇规定毋庸置疑,但当成员要求额外的特别待遇时,应仅在个案分析的基础上,基于以下理由进行评估:
 
(1)a clear identification of the development objectivethat is being affected by the rule in question;
明确确定受到有关规则影响的发展目标;
 
(2)an economicanalysis of the impact of the rule and of the expected benefits of itsrelaxation;
对该规则的影响及其放宽后的预期效益进行经济分析;
 
(3)an analysis of the impact of the requested flexibilityon other WTO Members;
分析额外增加的灵活性对WTO其他成员的影响;
 
(4)a specification of the time period for whichflexibility is requested and of its scope of application (one Member, a group ofMembers or all developing country Members).
 
明确灵活性适用的时间段和适用范围(一个成员、一组成员或所有发展中国家成员)。
 
Depending onthe outcome of this analysis, various approaches can be used to consider additionalflexibilities.
 
根据分析的结果,可以使用各种方法来考虑额外的灵活性。
 
(三)Proposals to strengthen theprocedural aspects of the WTO’s rulemaking activities
关于加强WTO规则制定程序方面的建议
 
The blockage of the WTO’s negotiating function confirmsthe need for flexibility in terms of negotiating approaches. This reflects theconcept of flexible multilateralism, where Members interested in pursuing a certain issuewhich is not yet ready for a full multilateral consensus, should be ableto advance the issue and reach an agreement if its benefits are made availableto all other Members on an MFN basis. However, other ideas should be explored as well with a view tostrengthening the negotiating function and helping build political engagementand support for multilateral negotiations.
 
世贸组织谈判职能的不良发挥,证实了谈判方式需要灵活性。这反映了灵活的多边主义的概念,在这个概念中,如果在最惠国待遇的基础上对其他所有成员都有益,那么,有兴趣寻求一个尚未准备充分达成多边一致意见的问题的成员应该能够推动这一问题并达成协议。但是,还应探讨其他想法,以期强化谈判职能,帮助建立政治参与和支持多边谈判。
 
In this regard, the EU shouldpursue the following issues:
为此,欧盟应继续探讨以下问题:
 
Multilateralnegotiations: Maintain support for full multilateral negotiations andoutcomes in areas where this is possible.
多边谈判:在可能的范围内,支持全面的多边谈判和及其达成的协议。
 
Plurilateralnegotiations: In areas where multilateral consensusis unattainable, actively support and pursue plurilateral negotiationswhich should remain open to all Members to join and whose results will beapplied on an MFN basis. Explore the feasibility of amending the WTO agreementso as to create a new Annex IV.b. which would contain a set of plurilateralagreements that are applied on an MFN-basis and which could be amended througha simplified process.
 
有限多边谈判:在无法达成多边协商一致意见的领域,积极支持和进行有限多边谈判,这些谈判应继续向所有成员国开放,其结果将在最惠国待遇的基础上得到应用。探讨修改《WTO协定》的可行性,以创建一个全新的协议,它将包括一套在最惠国待遇基础上适用的有限多边协定,这些协定可以通过简化程序加以修订。
 
Role of thesecretariat: the EU should put forward a proposal for a MinisterialDecision which strengthens the role of the WTO Secretariat in support ofvarious negotiating processes as well as in the implementation and monitoringfunctions.
 
秘书处的作用:欧盟应提出一项关于部长决定的建议,以加强世贸组织秘书处在支持各种谈判进程以及执行和监测职能方面的作用。
 
Buildingpolitical support: the EU should explore with other Members possible waysof building greater political support and engagement in the WTO, includingpossible options as to the frequency of Ministerial Conferences as well as waysof intensifying Senior Officials processes.
 
建立政治支持:欧盟应与其他成员国探讨在WTO中获得更大政治支持和参与的可能途径,包括部长级会议频率的可能选择,以及强化高级官员程序的方式。


三、关于常规工作和透明度的建议


Background/背景
 
The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 gave theCommission a mandate to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectivesof (1) making the WTOmore relevant and adaptive to a changing world, and (2) strengthening the WTO's effectiveness. Making theWTO’s regular work and monitoring function more effective is a key component ofthis process.
 
2018年6月28日至29日,欧洲理事会授权欧盟委员会实施世贸组织现代化计划,以实现以下目标:(1)提高世贸组织对变化中的世界的适应性和相关;(2)增强世贸组织的有效性。这一进程的关键组成部分,是使世贸组织的常规工作和监督职能更加有效。
 
Broader contextand the focus of EU efforts
大背景和欧盟努力的重点
 
With its negotiating function paralysed and its disputesettlement system challenged, the WTO post-MC11 is in an existential struggle toremain a credible basis for trade relationships. The so-called regular work inthe WTO's councils and committees – i.e. the work that is neither related tonegotiations nor dispute settlement – can be such a basis to some extent anddoes useful work, but itspotential is generally underutilised. Making this regular work respond moreeffectively and efficiently to the real interests of stakeholders would helpkeep the WTO relevant at a time where solutions to the negotiating and disputesettlement functions are being sought.
 
由于谈判功能瘫痪和争端解决机制面临的挑战,世贸组织在第十一届部长会议结束后,正处在一场事关存亡的努力之中,目的是想保持其作为贸易关系可信性的基础地位。世贸组织理事会和委员会中所谓的常规性工作——即既不涉及谈判也不涉及解决争端的工作——在某种程度上可以作为这一基础,并能发挥有益的作用,但其潜力没有得到充分利用。使这一常规性工作更有效地响应利益攸关方的真正利益,将有助于解决谈判和争端解决职能的同时,保持世贸组织的相关性。
 
Overallobjective for modernization
现代化的整体目标
 
The long-term objective is to enable the WTO to achievemore concrete results in terms of i) ensuring transparency about Members' trade measures, ii) solvingspecific trade concerns before they get to litigation state and iii) incrementallyadjusting the WTO rulebook, where necessary.
 
长期目标是使世贸组织在以下方面取得更具体的成果:1)确保成员国贸易措施的透明度;2)在成员国进入诉讼状态之前解决具体的贸易问题;
 
Futureproposals/未来的建议
 
A.Transparencyand notifications
透明性和通知
 
A fundamental task of the WTO is to monitor whetherMembers implement the WTO agreements properly and whether they make their tradepolicies transparent by following WTO notification rules. This monitoring isdone in the regular WTO councils and committees as well as the Trade PolicyReview Body.
 
世贸组织的一项根本任务是监督各成员国是否正确执行世贸组织协定,以及它们是否按照世贸组织通知规则,使其贸易政策透明化。这种监测是在世贸组织的定期理事会和委员会以及贸易政策审查机构中进行的。
 
While the EU invests significant resources to makecomplete and timely notifications, several of our top trading partners do not complysufficiently with notification obligations. As a result, their tradepractices remain opaque, which makes it impossible to monitor compliance withWTO rules and seek their enforcement. Where EU firms cannot get the informationon how to access markets, they cannot compete with domestic firms on an equalfooting. In order to remedy this long-standing problem, the EUproposes to improve or establish the following practices regardingnotifications:
 
尽管欧盟投入了大量资源来推动通知的及时性,但我们的几个主要贸易伙伴却没有充分履行该义务。因此,它们的贸易实践仍然不透明,这使得WTO不可能监督其遵守世贸组织规则的情况,也无法寻求实施这些规则。在欧盟企业无法获取如何进入市场的信息的国家(或地区),它们也无法在平等的基础上与国内企业竞争。为了解决这个长期存在的问题,欧盟建议改进或建立以下关于通知的做法:
 
1. More effectivecommittee-level monitoring:All committees overseeing WTO agreements with notificationobligations regularly review individual notifications and Members' generalperformance. These reviews, however, are not effective enough in closing gaps, partly becausethe Secretariat is not allowed to make qualitative assessments and Members arenot held accountable to explain the reasons for their underperformance. Thegaps are of particular concern in the area of trade in goods.
 
更有效的委员会级别的监督:所有具有监督WTO协议通知义务的委员会定期审查个别通知和成员的总体表现。然而,这些审查在缩小差距方面不够有效,部分原因是不允许秘书处评估其质量,而且成员也没有责任解释其业绩不佳的原因。这些差距在货物贸易领域特别令人关注。
 
As a first step,the EU proposes that each committee overseeingnotification obligations on trade in goods explores, under theoversight of the Council for Trade in Goods, how to make notification reviews more effective andinteractive, e.g. by i) introducing arequirement for Members to explain reasons for delays and provide a substantivereply to comments;ii) allowing theSecretariat to make more qualitative assessments both on notifications and onreplies to comments received;iii) publishing both comments on notifications and repliesthereto on a single, public database managed by the WTO;and iv) puttingnon-compliant Members more on the spot in meetings as well as written reports.
 
第一步,欧盟建议,在货物贸易委员会的监督下,监督货物贸易通知义务的各委员会探讨如何使通知审查制度更有效和更具互动性,例如:i)规定委员须解释延误的原因,并对意见作出实质的回应;ii)允许秘书处对所收到的通知和答复作出更实质性的评价;iii)在世贸组织管理的单一公共数据库上发表关于通知和答复的评论;iv)在会议和书面报告中,增加对不遵守规则的成员的曝光。

2. Incentivesfor improving notification compliance:The EU acknowledges that numerous WTO Members, particularlysmall developing countries, have limited resources for meeting notificationobligations and deadlines. While acknowledging these constraints, it should beborne in mind that notifications form a central part of the monitoringprocesses of the WTO and may provide advantages to the notifying Member itselfas it may contribute to stimulating reflection about administrative coherencedomestically. Significant resources already exist for assisting Members whoexperience capacity constraints to meet their notification obligations, including inthe form of WTO technical assistance.
 
改善遵守通知规则的激励措施:欧盟承认,许多世贸组织成员国,特别是小的发展中国家,在履行通知义务和期限方面的资源有限。在承认这些限制的同时,应当记住,通知是世界贸易组织监管过程的中心部分,对通知成员本身有利,因为它可能有助于促进国内对执政连贯性的思考。已有大量资源用于协助能力受到限制的成员履行其通知义务,包括以世贸组织技术援助的形式。
 
The EU proposes to examine, together withother WTO Members and the WTO Secretariat, whether improvements in the provision of assistanceare necessary. The EU also encourages making more use of workshops anddedicated informal discussions at committee level to share information and bestpractices, and todisseminate the results more widely. Further, improvements in a Member's notification practiceshould be showcased and lauded more in meetings, reports and TPRs.
 
欧盟建议与世贸组织其他成员国和世贸组织秘书处一道审查是否有必要改善提供援助的条件。欧盟还鼓励更多地利用研讨会和专门委员会级别的非正式讨论,以分享信息和最佳做法,并更广泛地传播讨论结果。此外,应在会议、报告和定期报告中更多地展示和表扬会员国对通知实践的改进。
 
3. Sanctionsfor wilful and repeated non-compliance:A distinction needs to be drawn between, on the onehand, lack ofcapacity to prepare notifications and missing deadlines for a justifiablereason and, on the otherhand, systematicobfuscation. The latter is a serious breach of the spirit and rules of themultilateral trading system but, at present, has no consequence for the Member in breach beyondbeing exposed to complaints by others.
 
对故意和重复不遵守规定的制裁:一方面,需要区分缺乏准备通知的能力和出于正当理由错过最后期限的情况,另一方面,要厘清系统性偏差。后者严重违反了多边贸易制度的精神和规则,但目前对违反这一制度的成员来说,除了受到其他国家的控诉外,没有任何后果。
 
The EU considers that instruments are needed to enforcenotification compliance wherecapacity constraints are not the issue and proposes towork with other WTO Members, including the United States who recently made aproposal in this regard, on developing sanctions which are effective, fair andcommensurate. Such sanctions could include, inter alia, exposing non-compliant Members to stronger criticismat a political level and in public and limiting certain rights related toparticipation in WTO proceedings (e.g. chairing WTO bodies, seeking replies from other Members).
 
欧盟认为,在不存在能力限制的情况下,需要有文书来执行遵守通知的规定,并建议与世贸组织其他成员国合作,包括美国在内。美国最近在这方面提出了一项建议,要求制定有效、公平和相称的制裁措施。除其他制裁外,还包括在政治层面和公共层面,使不遵守规则的成员受到更强烈的批评,并限制参与世贸组织诉讼的某些权利(例如,担任世贸组织各机构的主席,寻求其他成员的答复)。
 
4. Counter-notifications, i.e.notifications made by a Member on behalf of another, are apotentially powerful instrument available in various agreements. They are, however, hardly used, partly becausepreparing them requires a significant amount of research and intelligence.
 
反通知,即一个成员代表另一个成员发出的通知,是各种协议中可能具有强大效力的工具。然而,它们很少被使用,部分原因是准备它们需要大量的研究和智慧。
 
The EU proposes to i) cooperate more with like-minded Members in preparingjoint counter-notifications, ii) explore how the WTO Secretariat could be involved more, whilstguarding its neutrality towards Members, and iii) strengthen the consequences of a Member being subjectto a counter-notification.
 
欧盟建议:i)与志同道合的成员国加强合作,共同准备反通知;ii)探讨WTO秘书处如何能更多地参与,同时保持对成员国的中立;iii)增强成员受到反通知的后果。
 
Strengthening the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM):Even though the TPRM has no mandate to assess Members' compliancewith WTO rules, it is a useful tool for peer pressure. Moreover, the vastamount of information on Members’ trade policy measures which is gathered boththrough the reviews of individual Members and the biannual global trademonitoring reports feeds into the work of other committees. A particular assetis that the Secretariat can do its own research when preparing its reports anduse information from other Members to highlight measures even if they have notbeen notified – provided that the Member under review does not object to thisinformation being included in the report.
 
强化贸易政策审查机制(TPRM):尽管TPRM没有授权评估成员国遵守世贸组织规则的情况,但它是成员国向其它成员国施加压力的有用工具。此外,通过对个别成员的审查和半年一次的全球贸易监测报告收集的关于各成员贸易政策措施的大量资料,也有助于其他委员会的工作。一个特别的优点是,秘书处在编写其报告时可以自己进行研究,并利用其他成员提供的资料来突出各项措施,即使这些措施没有得到通知——只要所审查的成员不反对将这些资料列入报告。
 
Bearing in mind that improvements to the functioning ofthe TPRM can only be negotiated during an appraisal of the TPRM (the lastappraisal took place in 2016 and there is no date yet for the next one), the EUproposes to increase the effectiveness of the TPR exercise by empowering theSecretariat to go further in assessing notification performance in its reportfor a Member's review. The information on notifications could be expanded intoa separate chapter and made more informative by systematically highlightingqualitative aspects of compliance and describing how the Member's notificationperformance has evolved since the last review.
 
这一点需铭记在心:只有在评估贸易政策审查机制之后,才能对如何改善贸易政策审查机制的运作进行谈判(上次的评估是在2016年进行的,下一个评估的日期还没有确定),欧盟建议通过授权秘书处进一步评估通知执行的情况,以提高贸易政策审查机制工作的有效性。关于通知的信息可以扩大成单独的一章,并通过系统地介绍实质性遵守规则的表现,以及描述自上次审查以来成员的表现如何演变,而使其内容更加丰富。
 
B.Solving marketaccess problems
 
解决市场准入问题
 
Raising awareness on trade irritants and seekingclarifications from the Member applying them is an essential part of the workof numerous committees. Despite the significant amount of time and resourcesthat the EU and some like-minded Members put into raising these irritants, the outcomesare slim for a number of reasons. Most importantly, not givingsatisfactory replies – or not giving a reply at all – does not have realconsequences for a Member, beyond being put on the spot for the duration of theagenda point. The result is repetitive meetings in which speaking points getrecycled.
 
提高对刺激贸易的方法的认识,并要求使用这些刺激方法的成员对其作出说明,是许多委员会工作的一个重要部分。由于某些原因,尽管欧盟和一些志同道合的成员国投入了大量的时间和资源来评估这些刺激措施,但结果不尽人意。最重要的是,没有作出令人满意的答复——或根本没有作出答复——对一个成员来说,除了被曝光,并没有其他实质性的后果。其结果是重复的会议,以及这些要点被不断重复。
 
The EU proposesto make the pre-litigation problem solving of the WTO more effective by:Developing rules that oblige Membersto give substantive replies within specific timeframes to written questions byother Members or to specific trade concerns raised by other Members in aCommittee meeting;andStrengtheningcross-committee coordination on market access issues (i.e. makingsure that the various measures criticised at CTG level are coherently followedup on in the TRIMS, TBT and Market Access Committee, for example), with the helpof the Secretariat.
 
欧盟建议通过以下方式提高尚未进入WTO诉讼程序的问题的解决效率:制定规则,要求成员国在特定时间内对其他成员国提出的书面问题或其他成员国在委员会会议上提出的具体贸易问题作出实质性答复;在秘书处的帮助下,加强跨委员会在市场准入问题上的协调例如,确保在CTG层面受到批评的各项措施在《与贸易有关的投资措施》、《技术性贸易壁垒》和市场准入委员会等方面得到持续跟进)。
 
C. Adjusting theWTO rulebook incrementally
 
逐步调整WTO规则手册
 
The regular WTO councils and committees also have theability to incrementally adjust and clarify the WTO rulebook outside thenegotiations. While there are examples of such incremental adjustments (e.g. thecatalogue of instruments available to manage SPS issues adopted by the SPSCommittee on 2 March 2018, the CTG decision of 2012 on notification proceduresfor quantitative restrictions or the 2000 Decision of the TBT Committee onprinciples for the development of international standards), decisions withreal consequence are rare. Often, the WTO’s ability to adjust its rules throughcommittee work hinges on the mandate of the committee concerned:While some bodies like the TBT andSPS Committees are mandated to further the TBT and SPS Agreements, other bodiesare limited to monitoring and implementing the agreements they oversee.
 
世贸组织理事会和委员会也有能力在谈判之外逐步调整和澄清世贸组织规则。虽然曾有这样的渐进式调整的案例(例如2018年3月2日SPS委员会通过的用于管理SPS问题的工具目录,2012年CTG关于数量限制通知程序的决定或2000年TBT国际标准发展原则委员会的决定),但关于实际结果的决策却是罕见的。通常,世贸组织通过委员会的努力调整规则的能力,取决于相关委员会的授权:虽然技术壁垒和SPS委员会等一些机构被授权推进技术壁垒和SPS协议,但其他机构仅限于监督和执行它们监督的协议。
 
More incremental adjustments could help demonstratethat the WTO is able to evolve even though its negotiating function is notdelivering the expected results. The EU proposes to assess, agreement byagreement, whethertargeted proposals could be put forward for advancing WTO rules. Such proposalscould either be topics which were part of the DDA negotiations or new ideas, should reflectthe interests of stakeholders and be able to get traction among WTO Members.
 
更多的渐进式调整可能有助于证明,尽管WTO的谈判职能未能实现预期结果,但它仍有能力不断演化。欧盟建议逐项评估目标建议是否可以被提出,以推进WTO规则。这些提议可以是多哈发展议程谈判的一部分,也可以是新的想法,它们应该反映利益攸关方的利益,并能够在WTO成员国中获得支持。
 
D.  Downsizing ineffective committees
 
裁减无效的委员会
 
The flipside to investing more resources into the workof some committees would be deactivating those that are running idle. There areseveral bodies which were created to address specific issues of interest to agroup of Members at a particular moment in time, but which proponents no longer feed with input.Deactivating would not necessarily mean shutting these bodies down completely, but puttingthem to rest – like the Working Groups on the Singapore issues. Alternatively, the number ofmeetings could be reduced, as was done in the case of services bodies where onlythe Council for Trade in Services meets regularly whereas its subsidiary bodiesare only convened upon explicit request by a Member.

向某些委员会投入更多资源,也意味着停止运行有些闲置的委员会。有几个机构是为了在某个特定时刻处理一群成员感兴趣的具体问题而设立的,但支持者不再提供新的意见。停止运行这些机构并不一定意味着完全关闭它们,只是让它们休息休息就像新加坡问题工作组那样。另一种办法是,降低会议的频数,就像服务部门的情况那样,只有服务贸易理事会定期开会,而其附属机构只有在一个成员明确要求时才开会。



四、关于争端解决机制的建议


Introduction/引言
 
This paperexamines possible approaches in order to follow up on the European Councilconclusions of 28 June 2018. The European Council underlined, in a contextof growing trade tensions, the importance of preserving and deepening therules-based multilateral system and stated that the EU is committed to workingtowards its modernisation. The European Council invited the Commission topropose a comprehensive approach to improving, together with like-minded partners, thefunctioning of the WTO in crucial areas, including "more effective and transparent disputesettlement, including theAppellate Body, with a view toensuring a level playing field." (paragraph 16 of the conclusions)
 
本文研究了可能的方法,以便对欧洲理事会2018年6月28日的决议采取后续行动。在全球贸易日益紧张的背景下,欧洲理事会强调了维护和深化以规则为基础的多边体系的重要性,并表示欧盟应致力于实现其现代化。欧洲理事会(European Council)邀请欧盟委员会(European Commission)提出一项全面方案,与志同道合的伙伴一道,改善世贸组织在关键领域的运作,包括“更有效、更透明的争端解决机制,包括上诉机构,以确保公平的竞争环境”。(结论第16段)
 
Context/背景
 
The disputesettlement function of the WTO is at grave danger, and swift action by Members is needed to preserve it. Ifthe United States' blockage of Appellate Body appointments continues, it willundermine the WTO dispute settlement at the latest by December 2019. At thatpoint in time, there will beless than 3 Appellate Body members left, which is the minimum number required for the AppellateBody to hear an appeal. Without a functioning Appellate Body, any party tothe dispute may attempt to block the adoption of panel rulings (by appealing it), so – if noaction is taken – this may undermine the operation WTO dispute settlement as awhole.
 
世界贸易组织的争端解决功能处于严重危险之中,需要各成员国迅速采取行动来维护它。如果美国继续阻挠对上诉机构成员的任命,最迟将于2019年12月破坏世贸组织争端解决机制。届时,上诉机构成员将不足3人,这是上诉机构听取诉讼的最少人数。如果没有一个有效的上诉机构,争议的任何一方都可能试图(通过上诉)阻止陪审团裁定的通过。因此,如果不采取行动,这可能会破坏整个WTO争端解决体系。
 
如何解释任命受阻?
 
起初,美国阻止任命的原因与“美国政治领导人不断变化”有关,从2016年8月开始,美国开始关注所谓的上诉审查工作程序第15条的问题。根据这一规定,上诉机构可授权其离任成员完成未决上诉的处理。美国曾在DSB会议上多次表示,它无法支持启动对新上诉机构成员的遴选程序。它认为,对于不再是上诉机构成员的人发出的报告进行讨论,以及决定如何处理,也是DSB的优先事项。此后,美国一再重申,它“仍然坚决认为,各会员国需要把解决这一问题作为优先事项”。
 
一开始时,这似乎是关于任命程序所引起的唯一具体关切,但在最近几个月,美国也表示了一些其他涉及上诉机构运作的关切。这些关切在解决争端机构的会议上得到了明显的阐述。这包括第17.5条所规定的90天期限问题,该问题是美国在2018年6月22日的委员会会议上提出并详细讨论的。美国还关注上诉机构的调查结果,美国认为,这些调查结果对解决争端没有必要。
 
总统2018年贸易政策议程最近总结了“美国对世贸组织争端解决的关切”。其中一些关注点已经在前几届美国政府时期提出,其中还有一些问题(比如第15条规则的问题)是新的。
 
本文件列举了下列“对上诉机构做法的关注的例子:
 
4. 无视90天上诉期限:美国实质上是在批评AB不尊重DSU第17.5条,根据这条,“在任何情况下,诉讼程序都不应超过90天”。在美国看来,这引发了对透明度、与“迅速解决争端”不一致,以及90天后报告有效性的不确定性的担忧。
 
2. 由不再是上诉机构成员的人继续提供服务:美国声称,上诉机构“无权将非上诉机构成员视为成员”。美国认为,是争端解决机构,而不是上诉机构,有权力和责任决定任用期满的人是否应继续任职。
 
3. 对不需要解决争议的问题发表咨询意见:美国指出,“世贸组织的报告有一种倾向,它使调查结果对于解决争端而言是不必要的,或是针对争端中未出现的问题而提出的”。他们特别指出“一个令人震惊的例子”——“上诉机构的超过三分之二的分析——46页——本质上是只是附带说明”。
 
4. 上诉机构对事实和成员国国内法的审查:美国批评了上诉机构审查事实的方式。根据DSU第17.6条,上诉仅限于“小组报告所涵盖的法律问题和小组制定的法律解释条例”。然而,美国认为,上诉机构“一贯按照不同的法律标准审查调查结果,所得出的结论并非基于小组事实调查结果或无可争议的事实”。美国认为,上诉机构审查小组关于国内立法的含义(这应该是一个事实问题)的调查结果的情况更是如此。
 
5. 上诉机构声称其报告有权被视为判例:美国声称,上诉机构声称其报告有效地充当了判例,以及专家组遵循此前缺乏“有力理由”的上诉机构报告,在世贸组织规则中没有任何依据。美国提出,“尽管上诉机构报告可以对涉及的协议提供有价值的说明,但上诉机构报告本身并不是一致同意的文本,也不能替代经过谈判和商定而成的文本。”
 
此外,美国对上诉机构在各种争端中“增加或减少权利和义务”提出了更实质性的关切。具体而言,上诉机构对下列问题的裁决就证明了这一点:对《补贴协定》下的“公共机构”概念的解释、对《技术性贸易壁垒协定》第2.1条下的非歧视性义务的解释、关于保障措施的某些解释(特别是关于“未预见的事态发展”),欧盟对伯德修正案(将反倾销/反补贴税所得给予美国工业)和“外国销售公司”(被视为出口补贴)税收待遇提起诉讼的结果。美国认为,这些争端的调查结果与谈判达成的有关世贸组织协定不符。
 
EU position/欧盟的立场
 
针对美国提出的关切是否有充分根据,欧盟持不偏不倚的立场。在此前提下,为保留并进一步增强其主要特点和原则的同时,本文探讨了处理这些关切,并以此改进WTO体制的途径,同时。
 
为了平衡各方诉求,本文还探讨了其他可能的改进路径。特别是2016年,在美国否决重新任命一名新的上诉机构成员后,人们普遍认为,为了保持上诉机构成员的独立性和公正性,需要系统性的解决方案。
 
这些不同的解决方案应该被看作是一个整体的各个部分。特别是强化上诉机构及其成员的独立性,使它们能够为与世贸组织成员的互动引入一种额外的机制,而不必担心这种互动会过分影响它们的决定。
 
Futureproposals/未来的建议
  
欧盟应提出一项全面的建议,以解决世贸组织成员反对上诉机构任命的问题,这可能改善该制度的运作,同时保留和进一步加强世贸组织争端解决制度的主要特点和原则。这项建议——在第一阶段中——旨在提高程序的效率,为上诉机构和世贸组织成员之间更好的互动创造条件,同时加强上诉机构的独立性。在第二阶段,将讨论有关实施世贸组织规则的实质性问题。
 
第一阶段:全面修订与上诉机构运行有关的争端解决机制的规定,处理与上诉机构的“方法”有关的所有相关事项
  
本修正案包括下列内容。这些内容还需要进行更深入的反思,以确定这些修正案的确切范围和性质:
 
争端解决机制第17.5条及90天期限的问题:通过提高上诉机构的透明度和协商义务,改变争端解决机制第17.5条中的90天规则。特别地,17.5条可以修正为:“在任何情况下,诉讼程序不得超过90天,除非当事各方一致同意”。
 
如果上诉机构估计报告将在90天时限之外完成,则在上诉程序早期阶段(甚至在上诉提出之前)就需要与各方进行协商。如果当事各方没有就超过这一时限达成协议,应该存在某种机制,根据这种机制,可以对个别上诉的程序或工作安排加以调整,以确保90天的会议时间。

此外,下列变动将对上诉审查的时限产生积极影响:将上诉机构成员数量由7名增至9名。这将有助于提高上诉机构的效率,同时,在重要成员加入后,还可改善上诉机构的地域平衡。此外,上诉机构的内部组织也可以得到改善(例如,三名成员组成的三个司可随时听取上诉,而这些司的成员数目不会有重叠)。
 
上诉机构成员的交接规则:将第15(或类似)条编入争端解决机制,以解决美国对该规则未获世贸组织成员批准的担忧。例如,争端解决机制可以规定,即将离任的上诉机构成员应处理完该成员任期内已经举行听证会的未决上诉。
 
对解决争端没有必要调查结果:修正争端解决机制第17.12条,根据该条,上诉机构应就上诉“处理所提出的每一个问题”。例如,可以加上“在解决争端所必需的程度上”。这将解决人们对上诉机构发表冗长的“咨询意见”的担忧,也间接地解决了与第17.5条有关的关切(90天)。
 
作为事实问题的市政法律的含义:可以澄清的是,“专家组报告中涉及的法律问题和专家组制定的法律解释”并不包括市政措施的含义(尽管它们确实包括,而且应该包括世贸组织法律规定的法律特征)。为此目的,可以在该部第17.6条“为了更确定的[…]”中加一个脚注。

判例的问题:为上诉机构与世贸组织成员定期交换意见提供机会(例如每年举行的会议),并在条例第17.14条赋予成员权利的基础上,就通过后上诉机构的报告发表意见。这将提供一个额外的“沟通渠道”,可以表达对某些上诉机构行事方式和方法的关切(例如,将以前的裁决视为先例,而不考虑判例法的演变)。为了避免对上诉机构成员施加不适当的压力,还可以为此类会议设定适当的透明度和“基本规则”。
 
上诉机构成员的独立性:为上诉机构成员提供一个单一,但较长(6-8年)的任期。这将解决欧盟(以及世贸组织绝大多数成员国)对上诉机构独立性的关切。它还将提高上诉机构的效率(一个人的任期的长短是肯定的,而更长的任期将使他从工作经验中获益)。
 
第二阶段:处理实质性问题

如上所述,美国对上诉机构(“越权”)所作的解释提出异议,尤其,但不完全是在贸易保护领域。在不损害欧盟对上诉机构所谓“越权”的立场的情况下,有人指出,世贸组织成员国可以根据有关程序修改或解释实质性规则。在第二阶段,一旦阻止上诉机构成员的任命程序被解除,WTO成员就会就这些可能的变化或权威解释进行讨论。
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