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CBAM碳边境调节机制“碳关税”的正当性与中国应对

2023-9-27 15:33

来源: 安杰世泽律师事务所 作者: 李若晴

CBAM背后是“以规则为基础的国际秩序”的规则观,意图使国内法凌驾于国际法之上


[35]它固然体现了欧盟在环保问题上的鲜明立场与道义制高点的定位,但其客观上有利保护欧盟传统产业竞争力,通过绿色产业带动疫情后的经济复苏。作为一项单边措施,CBAM的外溢效应极强,在效果上迫使第三国采取欧盟水平的碳定价机制,向发展中国家施加了与其温室气体排放责任显著不成比例的负担。

我国坚定捍卫“以国际法为基础的国际秩序”,应在国际机构等多边论坛上强调CBAM与国际贸易法、多边环境协定兼容不足的问题。另外,鉴于国际法的“不确定性”,36我国应深入研究WTO法、CBDRRC适用于CBAM的潜在争议问题,联合其他发展中国家在CBAM国际合规性的多边讨论上积极发声,挑战西方国家的国际法话语霸权,确保对有关国际法规则的公平合理解释。

注释:

[1] Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford University Press, 2019), Introducton, p. xiv.

[2] ‘Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the 30th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change hosted by India on 8th April 2021’, para. 19, see https://www.gov.za/nr/speeches/joint-statement-issued-conclusion-30th-basic-ministerial-meeting-climate-change-hosted.

[3] ‘China says CO2 border tax will damage global climate change fight’, 27 November 2019, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-accord-china-idUSKBN1Y105T.

[4] Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (“Final Act”), para. 15.

[5] GATT, Art. 11.

[6] GATT, Art. 1.

[7] GATT, Art. 20.

[8] Agreement on Subsidiesand Countervailing Measures, Art. 3.1 (a).

[9] “学界对CBAM应被视为‘边界’或‘内部’措施展开了广泛讨论”。See Gracia Marín Durán, ‘Securing Compatibility of Carbon Border Adjustments with the Multilateral Climate and Trade Regimes’ International & Comparative Law Quarterly 72, no. 1, p. 91.

[10] See Joost Pauwelyn & David Kleimann, ‘Trade Related Aspects of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. A Legal Assessment’, 14 April 2020, fn. 11, see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_BRI(2020)603502.

[11] GATT, Art. 2.2 (a).

[12] GATT, Art. 3.

[13] Final Act, para. 21.

[14] 根据WTO判例中的权衡测试(weighing and balancing test),欧盟须证明鉴于应对气候变化的重要性,CBAM的贸易限制性与其对该政策目标的贡献成比例,且不存在贸易限制性更低、合理可用的措施能在同等程度上实现该目标。

[15] 前言部分的高门槛是大多数援引第20条案件败诉的主要原因。截止2022年底,WTO争端解决机构审查了第20条的28个案件中仅3个成功援引了该抗辩。

[16] European Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper – Impact Assessment Report’ SWD (2021) 643 final (“Impact Assessment”), p. 8.

[17] Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 161.

[18] Gracia Marín Durán, p. 83.

[19] Impact Assessment, pp. 3, 8.

[20] Final Act, paras. 71, 73-74.

[21] UNFCCC, Art. 3.1.

[22] Paris Agreement, Art. 2.2.

[23] Kyoto Agreement, Art. 3.1

[24] Paris Agreement, Art. 4.2.

[25] Paris Agreement, Art. 4.3.

[26] Impact Assessment, p. 30.

[27] Paris Agreement, Art. 4.5.

[28] UNCTAD, ‘A European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Implications for Developing Countries’ (2021), pp. 7, 9.

[29] Paris Agreement, Art. 4.6

[30] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’ COM(2021) 564 final, 4. Budgetary Implications, p. 11.

[31] Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, 2007, see https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1440.

[32] ‘Environment committee draws members’ broad engagement, considers proposals to enhance work’, 15 March 2023, see https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/envir_15mar23_e.htm.

[33] 《中方在世贸组织提交贸易与环境政策相关提案》,2023年6月19日,参见http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ap/p/202306/20230603417837.shtml

[34] ‘China berates EU at World Trade Organization for policies it calls unfair’, 6 June 2023, see https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3223047/china-berates-eu-world-trade-organization-policies-it-calls-unfair

[35] 参见蔡从燕:《论“以国际法为基础的国际秩序”》,载《中国社会科学》2023年第1期,第25-29页。

[36] 参见陈一峰:《国际法的“不确定性”及其对国际法治的影响》,载《中外法学》2022年第4期,第1102-1119页。

特别声明:文章仅代表作者观点,不视为安杰世泽律师事务所正式法律意见或建议。
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